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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANNOTATIONS
This section contains a digest of all reported decisions interpreting
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from the second week
in September, 1964, through the last week in November, 1964, in the
National Reporter System.
JOHN F. O'LEARY
STUART L. POTTER
SAMUEL E. SHAW II
ARTICLE I: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-103. Supplementary General Principles
of Law Applicable
SKEELS V. UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP.
222 F. Supp. 696 (1963), reversed in part, 335 F.2d 846 (1964)
Annotated under Section 1-203, infra.
SECTION 1-201. General Definitions
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) [Section 1-201(20)]
Annotated under Section 3-301, infra.
HUDSPETH MOTORS, INC. V. WILKINSON
382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964) [1-201(26)]
Annotated under Section 9-504, infra.
SECTION 1-203. Obligation of Good Faith
SKEELS V. UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP.
222 F. Supp. 696 (1963), reversed in part, 335 F.2d 846 (1964)
In the spring of 1959, the plaintiff, a franchised Chrysler automobile
dealer, agreed to let the defendant credit company finance the purchase of
his automobiles. In addition, the defendant made a capital loan of $25,000
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in the months that followed, was never in
default on this loan but was often in default on the cars he sold. The
defendant, however, disregarded these defaults, choosing not to enforce its
rights under their security arrangement. By the fall of 1960, the plaintiff
had fallen in arrears for the price of several cars. He thereupon applied for
a second loan of $25,000, which request was forwarded through channels to
the defendant's New York office where it was in fact denied. From the 10th
of November onward, however, the defendant's local representative almost
daily assured him that the loan had been approved and that a check was
forthcoming. While the plaintiff was waiting, the defendant notified Chrysler
Corporation that it was cancelling its agreements to pay for the plaintiff's
automobiles. On November 28th the defendant, on some pretext, acquired
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the keys to the plantiff's place of business, and early next morning, without
prior notice of any kind, removed from the plaintiff's establishment all the
new and used cars. Again without notice, the cars were sold. The plaintiff
brought a civil action in the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, alleging that the defendant had pre-emptively seized his
cars and thereby destroyed his business. He acknowledged that he was in-
debted to the defendant for the cars he had sold but argued that he was not
in default, that the defendant had waived its right to immediate payment by
acquiescing in earlier delays, and that the defendant therefore had no right
to repossess when and in the manner it did. The defendant counterclaimed:
(a) for the money still owed on the original loan ($12,400); (b) for the
price of nine cars which the plaintiff had sold but not paid for ($25,637.53);
(c) for the loss resulting from the sale of the repossessed cars ($9,378.16);
and (d) for the expenses of selling these cars ($1,259.21). The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff on his claim, awarding him $105,000 in compensa-
tory and punitive damages, and on the counterclaim found for the defendant
in the full amount of $48,674.90. On the plaintiff's motion, the court reduced
the defendant's recovery to $38,037.53, holding that under Section 9-504(3)
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the defendant was required to notify the
plaintiff of its intended disposition of the repossessed cars, and failure to
give such notice precluded it from recovering items (c) and (d) above, i.e.,
its deficiency.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that in view
of the local representative's misrepresentations the jury was justified in find-
ing that the repossession without notice constituted tortious destruction of
the plaintiff's business. It went on to say that such action could easily be
found to violate Section 1-203 which imposes an obligation of good faith on
any person seeking to enforce a contract within the purview of the Code.
The court also noted that the principles of "equity" and "estoppel" supple-
ment the Code, under Section 1-103.
On the issue of punitive damages, the court reversed, holding that under
the facts of the case, where the superior officers of the defendant were un-
aware of the misrepresentations of the local representative, punitive damages
were not called for under Pennsylvania law.
COMMENT
1. The plaintiff's waiver argument is, of course, sound. The only diffi-
culty he apparently had was in relating it to appropriate provisions of the
Code. He suggested, at the district court level, that his earlier delays in
payment and the defendant's acquiescence in them had established a "course
of dealing" under Section 1-205(1) or a "course of performance" under
Section 2-208(1), and that as a result of this "course of dealing" or "course
of performance," the contract provision calling for immediate payment had
been waived or modified. The only problem is that neither of these terms—
"course of dealing" or "course of performance"—are appropriate. Neither
describe with technical accuracy the conduct upon which the plaintiff relied
to demonstrate a waiver. Official Comment 2 to Section 1-205 explicitly
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states that "course of dealing" refers solely to a sequence of conduct under
contracts prior to the one in issue. It does not refer to conduct under the
present contract. Moreover, Section 1-205(4) clearly provides that when a
"course of dealing" hopelessly conflicts with an express term in the contract,
the latter controls. Thus, in asserting that the parties' conduct under the
present agreement had established a "course of dealing" and that this "course
of dealing" could be relevant to show a waiver of his obligation to pay forth-
with for the cars he had sold, the plaintiff simply drew from an erroneous
assumption an erroneous conclusion.
Nor did the delayed payments constitute a "course of performance"
under Section 2-208(1). While a "course of performance" does refer to a
pattern of action under the contract in issue and is relevant to demonstrate
the waiver of an inconsistent contractual provision, a "course of performance,"
as contemplated by the Code, relates solely to contracts for the sale of goods.
Sections 2-102 and 2-208(1) make this clear. However, the contract in
question is not for the sale of goods; it is a security arrangement.
This does not mean that the Code ignores or fails to recognize the
common law doctrine of waiver in commercial contracts other than those
for the sale of goods but simply that the plaintiff was hanging his hat on
the wrong sections of the Code. Instead of relying on Sections 1-205(1) and
2-208(1), he should have relied, as the circuit court cryptically suggested,
on Section 1-103 which sweepingly states that, unless otherwise provided,
the principles of law and equity, including estoppel, shall supplement the
Code.
2. The district court refused to award the defendant its deficiency be-
cause of its failure to give the plaintiff notice of resale. On the propriety
of this action, see the casenote to the lower court's decision in 5 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 580 (1964), from which most of this annotation is drawn.
S.L.P.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
BERK V. GORDON JOHNSON Co.
232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1964)
The plaintiff is a butcher and merchandiser of Kosher poultry. Wishing
to expand the size of his business, he negotiated with the defendant for the
purchase and sale of automated equipment. Before he ordered the equipment,
however, he was shown by the defendant a drawing which depicted how the
equipment would fit into his premises. In the lower right hand corner of the
drawing appeared the handwritten words, "Kosher operation." Later, the
plaintiff signed a purchase order prepared by the defendant. On the reverse
side of the order there was a clause in small print which disclaimed all
warranties, express or implied, except for a promise to repair or replace
defective parts within ninety days. When the equipment proved unsuitable
for the plaintiff's ritual purposes, he sued, inter alia, for breach of warranty,
alleging that the drawing constituted part of the contract and that the legend
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